This paper studies reinforcement learning (RL) under malicious falsification on cost signals and introduces a quantitative framework of attack models to understand the vulnerabilities of RL. Focusing on Q-learning, we show that Q-learning algorithms converge under stealthy attacks and bounded falsifications on cost signals. We characterize the relation between the falsified cost and the Q-factors as well as the policy learned by the learning agent which provides fundamental limits for feasible offensive and defensive moves. We propose a robust region in terms of the cost within which the adversary can never achieve the targeted policy. We provide conditions on the falsified cost which can mislead the agent to learn an adversary's favored policy. A numerical case study of water reservoir control is provided to show the potential hazards of RL in learningbased control systems and corroborate the results.
Introduction
With the advancement of reinforcement learning (RL) techniques, the application domains of RL have extended far beyond the areas of board and video games, personalized recommendations. The RL techniques have been integrated into physical systems, including power systems [10] , robotics [18] , transportation systems [1] , dam management [17] and autonomous vehicles [9] . The integration of learning with physical system can inherit vulnerabilities from individual components and suffer from higher risks and more drastic consequences. RL algorithms are inherently vulnerable to different types of adversarial attacks due to the cyber-physical nature of the algorithm. For instance, observations(actions) transmitted from environments(agents) to agents(environments) through communication networks based on standard communication protocols will be exposed to intentional and unforeseen falsification, fabrication and jamming. This will render the behavior of the physical system unpredictable. Also the integrity of reward/cost received can be comprised if deceptive signals are injected through a man-in-the-middle attack. With a strategic interception of reward/cost observations, the RL algorithms can be mislead to undesired policies aimed by the adversary. In the example of autonomous navigation, an agent with a provably safe RL policy can be misled into collisions via means such as the intentional perturbation of sensory inputs [3] .
Recent research has focused on the application of RL techniques for mitigating security risks [15] . In contrast, the literature on understanding the vulnerabilities and security of RL is sparse and sporadic. Even though few studies about the vulnerability of reinforcement learning models under adversarial environment and malicious attacks have developed [2] , there remains a need for a theoretic underpinning on the security of RL so that many critical applications would be safeguarded from potential risks.
One relevant area of research is safe RL [12] , which aims to ensure that the agent learns to behave in a way that are in compliance with some pre-defined criteria. The security problem, on the other hand, is concerned with settings where an adversarial element intentionally seeks to compromise the natural operation of the system for malicious purpose [2] . Apart from this, we must differentiate between RL security and the area of adversarial RL. The latter is concerned with multi-agent RL settings, in which agents aim to maximize their returns or minimize their cost in competition with other agents. Adversarial RL [3] provides a class of security models for RL but not all secure RL problem can be captured through such framework.
The architecture of a RL agent consists of several components depicted in Fig. 1 where each of these components can be targeted in adversarial attacks which are described as follows. Environment attack: During the learning process, agent learns optimal policy from sequential observations from the environment. An adversary may perturb the environment to deteriorate the learning results. Sensors attack: Agents observe the environment via their sensors, and the sensory observation of the state may be delayed, perturbed, or falsified under malicious attacks. Actuator attack: RL agents 'feedback' their environments by applying actions via actuators. If the attacker can manipulate the actuator, the manipulated action will differ from the one chosen by the agent with the objective to corrupt the experience agents have. Attacks on reward/cost signals: Manipulation of the reward signal produced by the environment in response to the actions applied by a RL agent can significantly affect the learning process. Take a RL-based Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) as an example, if the reward depends on the distance of the UAV to a desired destination measured by GPS coordinates, spoofing of GPS signals by the adversary may result in incorrect reward/cost signals.
In this paper, we study RL under malicious attacks on cost signals from an offensive perspective where an adversary/attacker maliciously falsifies the cost signals that the RL agent receives. We first introduce a general formulation of the attack models by formulating the objectives, information structure and the capability of an adversary which can serve as a corner stone for future works can built upon. Assuming that the agent uses Q-learning algorithm, we answer two fundamental questions: How will the falsification of cost signals affect the convergence of Q-learning algorithm? Where does the algorithm converge to under malicious falsification? We show that under stealthy attacks and bounded falsification on the cost signals, the Q-learning algorithm will still converge almost surely. If the algorithm converges, there is a relationship between the falsified cost and the limit Q-factors which can be described by a map and the map exists an inverse. We show that the map is uniformly Lipschitz continuous with an explicit Lipschitz constant and based on this, we characterize a robust region where the adversary can never achieve his desired policy if the falsified cost stays in the robust region. The map is shown to be Fréchet differentiable at certain region and Fréchet derivative is explicitly characterized which is independent of the falsified cost. The map shows 'piece-wise linear' property on a normed vector space. The derivative and 'piece-wise linear' property can be utilized by the adversary to drive the Q-factors to a desired region. We show that once the falsified cost satisfies certain conditions, the RL agent will learn an adversary desired policy. Based on these conditions, we discuss what the adversary can achieve according to the actions available to the adversary. An example is introduced to illustrate the theory and their applications to cost falsification problems and to show the potential hazard may caused by cost falsification. The contributions of our paper include:
1. As the first paper to study intentional cost signal falsification in RL, we present a general formulation of the attack models which can serve as a corner stone for future works to built upon. 2. We build solid theoretical underpinnings for explaining how the falsification will affect the Q-factors and hence the policy learned by the RL agents. 3. We characterize conditions on the deceptively falsified cost under which the Qfactors learned by the agent will produce the policy the adversary desires.
Related Works
In [11] , Everitt et. al. have studied RL for Markov Decision Process with corrupted reward channels where due to some sensory errors and software bugs, agents may get corrupted reward at certain states which is higher (or lower) than the true reward. Different from our work, their work is concerned with interior malfunction of sensors and software which result in the corrupted reward signals which is not a security problem and involves no intentional malicious attacks on reward signals. Besides, the impact of corrupted rewards on the learning results has not been well characterized theoretically and numerically. In [19] , Wang et. al. studied Q-learning with perturbed rewards where the rewards received by the RL agent are perturbed with certain probability and the reward only take values on a finite set. The perturbation in their work is completely unintentional and is a robust issue other than a security problem. Also, their work did not characterize how the perturbation affect the Q-factor that is learned from perturbed rewards. Compared the two works mentioned above, our work studied RL with falsified cost signals from a security point of view and we develop theoretical underpinning to characterize how the falsified cost will deteriorate the learning result.
Organization of the Paper
In Section 2, we discuss some preliminaries and formulate a general framework for attack models. In Section 3, we analyze the Q-learning algorithm under falsified cost.
In Section 4, we present an example to illustrate the theory we build and its applications.
Preliminaries and Problem Formulation

Preliminaries
Our RL agent interacts with an unknown environment and attempts to minimize the total of its collected costs. The environment is formalized as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) denoted by S , A , c, P, β . The MDP {Φ(t) : t ∈ Z} taking values in a finite state space S = {1, 2, ..., S} and controlled by a sequence of actions (sometimes called a control sequence) Z = {Z(t) : t ∈ Z} taking values in a finite action space A = {a 1 , ..., a A }. Throughout this paper, we will use the term action sequence and control sequence interchangeably. In our setting, we are most interested in stationary policies where the control sequence takes the form Z(t) = w(Φ(t)), where the feedback rule w is a function w : S → A . To emphasize the policy w, we denote
According to a transition probability kernel P, the controlled transition probabilities are given by p(i, j, a) for i, j ∈ S , a ∈ A . Commonly P is unknown to the agent. Let c : S × A → R be the one-step cost function, and consider first the infinite horizon discounted cost control problem of minimizing over all admissible Z the total discounted cost J(i,
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. The minimal value function is defined as V (i) = min J(i, Z), where the minimum is over all admissible control sequences Z. The function V satisfies the dynamic programming equation [4] 
and the optimal control minimizing J is given as the stationary policy defined through the feedback law w * given as w *
then V (i) = min a Q(i, a)and the matrix Q satisfies
If the matrix Q defined in (1) can be computed via value iteration or some other scheme, then the optimal control policy can be founded though a simple minimization, w * (i) = arg min a Q(i, a), i ∈ S . If transition probabilities are unknown so that value iteration is not directly applicable, the RL agent then can apply a stochastic approximation variant known as the Q-learning algorithm of Watkins [20] . This is defined through the recursion
is an independently simulated S -valued random variable with law p(i, ·, a).
Notations An indicator function 1 1 C is defined as 1 1 C (x) = 1 if x ∈ C and 1 1 C (x) = 0 otherwise. Denote 1 i ∈ R S a vector with S components whose ith component is 1 and other components are 0. The true cost at time t is denoted by the shorthand notion
. For a mapping f : For c ∈ R S×A , given a policy w, define c w ∈ R S whose ith component is c(i, w(i)). Define c a ∈ R S as a vector whose ith component is c(i, a). We define Q w , Q a the same way. For transition probability, we define P w ∈ R S×S as [P w ] i, j = p(i, j, w(i)) and P ia = (p(i, 1, a), p(i, 2, a), ..., p(i, S, a)) T ∈ R S . Define P a ∈ R S×S as the matrix whose components are [P a ] i, j = p(i, j, a).
General Attack Models
Under malicious attacks, our RL agent will not be able to observe the true cost feedback from the environment. Instead, the agent is given a cost signal that can be falsified by the attacker. Consider the following MDP with falsified cost (MDP-FC) denoting as S , A , c,c, P, β . In this MDP-FC, instead of observing c t ∈ R at each time t directly, the agent only observes a falsified c t denoted byc t ∈ R. The other aspects of MDPs remain unchanged.
Modeling of the adversary is comprised of three components: the objective of the adversary, actions available to the adversary, and the information at his disposal. The attacker's task is to design the falsified cost signalsc based on the information at his disposal and the actions available to him such that he can achieve certain objectives.
Objective of Adversary:
The objectives of the attackers are to maximize the agent's cost while keeping the cost of attacks low, to drive the MDP to a targeted process or to let the agent learn certain policies targeted by the attacker. For example, suppose w(c) is obtained by the agent using one of the learning algorithms with falsified cost signals. If the attacker's objective is to maximize the agent's cost and at the same time, minimize his own cost of attacking. Then, the objective of the attacker can be written as
If the objective of the attacker is to mislead the agent to learn a policy, denoted by w † , then the objective can be written as
The second term AttackCost(c) here serves as a measure for the cost of attacking. For example, we can define
where d(·, ·) is a metric, α is a discount factor. If d is a discrete metric, then ∑ T t=0 d(c t ,c t ) counts the number of times that the attacker falsifies the cost signal.
Remark 1.
Here,c represents all the possible ways that the adversary can take to generate falsified signals.
Information: It is important to specify what information an adversary has at his disposal since the attacks that an adversary can perform really depend on the information available to him. Based on the information structure of the attacker, we can classify them into several categories.
1. An attacker is called an omniscient attacker if the information the attacker has at time t, denoted by, I t , is defined as
An attacker is called a peer attacker if the attacker can only know what the agent knows at time t. That means
3. An attacker is called an ignorant attacker if at time t, he only knows the cost signals before time t, that is,
4. An attacker is called a blind attacker if the information the attacker has at time t, denoted by I t , is defined as
Remark 2. There are many other situations regarding the information set of the attacker that we could consider. In the definition of an omniscient attacker, c represents the true cost at every state-action pair which is different from c τ . The latter means the true cost generated at time τ. That is to say an omniscient attack knows the true cost at every state action pair (i, a) for all t.
Actions Available to Adversary: Even if it is possible that an adversary is omniscient, it does not mean that he can be omnipotent. The actions available to an adversary need to be confined. For example, an adversary may only be able to change the sign of the cost at certain time or he can only falsify the cost signals at certain states S ′ ⊂ S . Or the attacker can only make bounded perturbations to true cost signals. The restriction on the actions available to the attacker can also be captured by the attack cost. For example, if the attacker can only falsify the cost signal at some states S ′ ,
Moreover, the generation of falsified costs relies heavily on the information the attacker has. If the attacker is a peer attacker or an omniscient attacker, then the generation ofc may follow a certain function C : S × A × R → R. The falsified cost signal generated at time t will then bec t = C(Φ(t), Z(t), c t ). If the attacker only knows the state and the cost, the generation ofc follows by the function C :
Definition 2 (Stealthy Attacks). Ifc t takes the same value for the same state-action pair (Φ(t), Z(t)) for all t ∈ Z, i.e., for t = τ, if (Φ(t), Z(t)) = (Φ(τ), Z(τ)),c t has to be equal toc τ , then we say that the attacks on the cost signals are stealthy.
The definition states that the cost falsification remains consistent for the same stateaction pairs. We assume that the adversary performs only stealthy attacks. Otherwise, the RL agent will find out that the cost signals are falsified when he receives a different cost given the same state-action pair. This assumption is reasonable. Even ignorant attackers can perform stealthy attacks. Under stealthy attackers, the falsified costc can be viewed as a falsified cost matrix of dimension S × A. At time t, the cost received by the RL agent isc(Φ(t), Z(t)).
Q-Learning with Falsified Cost
If the RL agent learns the optimal policy by Q-learning algorithm given in (2), then under the stealthy attacks on cost, the algorithm can be written as
Note that if the attacks are not stealthy, we need to writec n instead ofc(i, a). There are two important concerns about the Q-learning algorithm with falsified cost (4): Will the sequence of Q n -factors converge? Where will the sequence of Q n converge to? We will address these two concerns in next section.
Suppose that the sequence Q n generated by the Q-learning algorithm (4) converges. LetQ * be the limit, i.e.,Q * = lim n→∞ Q n . Suppose the objective of the adversary is induce the RL agent to learn a particular policy w † . The adversary's problem then is to designc by applying the actions available to him based on the information he has so that the policy learned from the Q-learning algorithm produce the policy
In the next section, we will develop theoretical underpinnings that can help address the concerns regarding the convergence of (4) and the attainability of the adversarial objectives.
3 Analysis of Q-Learning with Falsified Cost
Convergence of Q-Learning Algorithm with Falsified Cost
In Q-learning algorithm (2), to guarantee almost sure convergence, the RL agent usually take tapering stepsize [5] {a(n)} which satisfies 0 < a(n) ≤ 1, n ≥ 0, and ∑ n a(n) = ∞, ∑ n a(n) 2 < ∞. Suppose in our problem, the RL agent takes tapering step. To answer the concerns about whether or not the Q-learning algorithm under falsified cost converges, where it converges to and under what conditions will it converge, we have the following result.
Theorem 1. If the adversary performs stealthy attacks with boundedc(i, a) for all i ∈ S , a ∈ A , then the Q-learning algorithm with falsified cost will converge to the fixed point ofF(Q) almost surely where the mappingF :
and the fixed point is unique and denoted byQ * .
Proof. sketch: If the adversary performs stealthy attacks, the falsified cost for each state-action pair is consistent during the learning process. The Q learning process thus can be written as (4) . Rewrite (4) as Q n+1 = Q n + a(n) h (Q n ) + M(n + 1) , wherẽ h(Q) :=F(Q) − Q and M(n + 1) is given as
Note that for any Q 1 , Q 2 ,h(Q 1 ) −h(Q 2 ) andF(Q 1 ) −F(Q 2 ) do not depend on the falsified cost. If the falsified cost is bounded, one can see thath(Q) is Lipschitz. And M(n + 1) is a Martingale difference sequence. Following the arguments in [5] (Theorem 2 Chapter 2) and Section 3.2 of [6] , we can see the iterates of (4) converges almost surely to the fixed points ofF. SinceF is a contraction mapping with respect to the max norm, with contraction factor β [4] (page 250), by Banach fixed point theorem (contraction theorem),F admits a unique fixed point.
It is not surprising that one of the conditions given in Theorem 1 to make sure the convergence is that the attacker perform stealthy attacks. The convergence can be guaranteed because the falsified cost signals are consistent over time for each state action pair. The uniqueness ofQ * comes from the fact that ifc(i, a) is bounded for every (i, a) ∈ S × A ,F is a contraction mapping. By Banach's fixed point theorem [14] ,F admits a unique fixed point. With this theorem, we know the adversary by stealthily falsifying the cost signals can make the algorithm converge.
Remark 3.
Weather an adversary wants convergence of the Q-learning algorithm (4) depends on his objective. In our setting, the adversary wants the RL agent learn the policy w † which means the adversary needs convergence and wants the limitQ * to lies in V w † .
How is the Limit Point Affected by the Falsified Cost
Now it remains to analyze, on behalf of the adversary, how to design the falsification of the cost signals so that the limit point which algorithm (4) converges to is desired by the adversary. In later discussions, we will only consider stealthy attacks where the falsified costs are consistent for same state action pairs. Denote the true cost by matrix c ∈ R S×A with [c] i,a = c(i, a) and the falsified cost is described by a matrixc ∈ R S×A with [c] i,a =c(i, a). Givenc, the fixed point ofF will be uniquely decided, i.e., the point that the algorithm (4) will converge to will be uniquely determined. Thus, there is a mappingc →Q * implicitly described by the relationF(Q) = Q. For convenience, this mapping is denoted by f : R S×A → R S×A . Theorem 2. LetQ * denote the Q-factor learned from algorithm (4) with falsified cost signals and Q * be the Q-factor learned from (2) with true cost signals. There exists a constant L < 1 such that
and L = β where the discounted factor β was defined in the MDP-FC problem.
. By Theorem 1, we knowQ * and Q * satisfyQ * =F(Q * ) and Q * = F(Q * ). We haveQ * −Q =F(Q * ) − F(Q * ). SinceF and F are both contraction mappings, by triangle inequality, we have Q * − Q * ≤ L Q * − Q * + c − c . Thus, we have (5) . And the contraction factor L forF and F is β . Remark 4. In fact, taking this argument just slightly further, one can conclude that falsification on cost c by a tiny perturbation will not cause significant change in the limit point of algorithm (2), Q * . This feature would make the effort of the adversary infertile who expects a 'butterfly effect'. This is a feature known as stability that is observed in problems that possess contraction mapping properties. Also, Theorem 2 indicates that the mappingc →Q * is continuous, and to be more specific, it is uniformly Lipchitz continuous with Lipchitz constant 1/(1 − β ).
With Theorem 2, we can characterize how much falsification the adversary needs at least to change the policy from the optimal policy w * the agent made to the targeted policy w † of the adversary. First, note that V w ⊂ R S×A and it can be also written as
We can easily see that for any given policy w, V w is a convex set, hence connected since for any λ ∈
Second, for any two different policies w 1 and w 2 , V w 1 ∩ V w 2 = ∅. Define the infimum distance between the true optimal policy w * and the adversary desired policy w † in terms of the Q-values by
which is also the definition of the distance between two sets V w * and V ω † . Note that for w * = w † (otherwise, the optimal policy w * is what the adversary desire, there is no incentive for the adversary to attack), D(w * , w † ) is always zero according to the definition of the set (6) . The counterintuitive result states the adversary that a small change in the Q-value may result in any possible change of policy that the RL agent can learn from the Q-learning algorithm (4). Compared with Theorem 2 which is a negative result to the adversary, this result is an encouraging one for the adversary. Similarly, define the pointQ * to set V w † distance by
Thus, ifQ * ∈ V w † , we have
where the first inequality comes from the fact that Q * ∈ V w * and the second inequality is due toQ * ∈ V w † . The robust region for the true cost c to the adversary's targeted policy w † is given by B(c;
which is an open ball with center c and radius (1 − β )D Q * (w † ). That means the attacks on the cost needs to be 'powerful' enough to drive the falsified costc outside the ball B(c; (1 − β )D Q * (w † )) to make the RL agent learn the policy w † . If the falsified costc is within the ball, the RL agent can never learn the adversary's targeted policy w † . The ball B(c; (1 − β )D Q * (w † )) depends only on the true cost c and the adversary desired policy w † (Once the MDP is given, Q * is uniquely decided by c). Thus, we refer this ball as the robust region of the true cost c to the adversarial policy w † . As we have mentioned in Section 2.2, if the actions available to the adversary only allows him to achieve bounded falsification of the true cost and the bound is small, then the adversary can never let the RL agent learn policy w † .
Remark 5. First, in discussions above, the adversary policy w † can be any possible polices and the discussion remains valid for any possible policies. Second, the set V w of Q-values is not just a convex set but also an open set. We thus can see that D Q * (w † ) > 0 for any w † = w * and the second inequality in (7) can be replaced by a strict inequality.
Third, the RL agent can estimate his own robustness to falsification if he can know the adversary desired policy w † . For an omniscient attacker or attackers who have access to the true cost signals, he can compute the robust region of the true cost to his desired policy w † in order to evaluate whether the objective is feasible or not. If it is not feasible, then the attacker can consider changing his objectives, e.g., selecting other favored policies that have a smaller robust region in terms of the true cost.
We have discussed how the falsification affects the change of Q-factors learned by the agent in a distance sense. The problem now is to study how to falsify the true cost in the right direction so that the resulted Q-factors fall into the favored region of the adversary. One difficulty of analyzing this problem comes from the fact that the mappingc →Q * is not explicit known. The relation betweenc andQ * is governed by the Q-learning algorithm (4). Another difficulty is that we need to resort to Fréchet derivative or Gâteaux derivative [8] (if they exist) due to the fact that bothc andQ * lies in the space of R S×A .
We have developed so far that the Q-learning algorithm converges to the unique fixed point ofF and that f :c →Q * is uniformly Lipschitz continuous thanks to the contraction property ofF. Also, it is easy to see that the inverse of f , denoted by f −1 , exists since givenQ * ,c is uniquely decided by the relationF(Q) = Q. Furthermore, by the relationF(Q) = Q, we know f is both injective and surjective and hence a bijection which can be simply shown by showing given differentc, the solution ofF(Q) = Q must be different. This fact informs that there is a one-to-one, onto correspondence betweenc andQ * . One should note that the mapping f : R S×A → R S×A is not uniformly 
for every i ∈ S , a ∈ A .
. By definition, Q * ,Q * ∈ V w . By Theorem 1, we haveQ * =F(Q * ) and Q * = F(Q * ) which means
From (9), we have
is invertible due to the fact that β < 1 and P w is a stochastic matrix. Thus,Q * w = Q * w + (I − β P w ) −1 h w . Substitute it into the first equation of (9), one haveQ h(i, a) .
From Theorem 3, we can see that f is Fréchet differentiable on f −1 (V w ) and the derivative is constant, i.e., the derivative f ′ (c) = G for anyc ∈ f −1 (V w ). Note that G lies in the space of all linear mappings that maps R S×A to itself and G is decided by the discount factor β and the transition kernel P of the MDP problem. The region where the differentiability may fail is
This is the place where the policy change happens when the Q(i, a) and Q(i, a ′ ) are both the lowest value among the ith row of Q. Also, due to the fact that f is Lipschitz, by Rademacher's theorem, f is differentialbe almost everywhere (w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure). To be more specific, if Q * is the Q-values learned from cost c by Q-learning algorithm (2), after the falsificationc, the Q-value learned from Q-learning algorithm (4) would beQ * = Q * + Gh ifc ∈ f −1 (V w ). Then, an omniscient adversary can utilize (8) to find a way of falsification h such thatQ * can be driven to approach a desired set V w † bearing in mind that D(w, w † ) = 0 for any two policies w, w † . One difficulty is to see whether
is now implicit. Thus, we resort to the following theorem.
Theorem 4. LetQ * ∈ R S×A be the Q-values learned from the Q-learning algorithm (4) with the falsified costc ∈ R S×A . ThenQ * ∈ V w † if and only if the falsified cost signalsc designed by the adversary satisfy the following conditions
for all i ∈ S , a ∈ A \{w † (i)}.
Proof. sketch: IfQ * ∈ V w † , from proof of Theorem 3, we knowQ * w † = (I − β P w † ) −1c w † and the ith component ofQ * w † is strictly less thanQ * (i, a) for each a ∈ A \{w † (i)}. That meansQ * (i, a) > 1 T iQ * w † which gives us (10) . Conversely, ifc satisfy conditions (10), Q * ∈ V w † due to the one-to-one, onto correspondence betweenc andQ * .
With the results in Theorem 4, we can characterize the set f −1 (V w ). Elements in f −1 (V w ) has to satisfy the conditions given in (10) . Also, Theorem 4 indicate that if the adversary wants the RL agent to learn the adversary desired policy w † , the falsified cost c has to satisfy the conditions specified in (10) . Note that for a = w † (i),c(i, w † (i)) ≡
w † . If the objective of an omnisicent attacker is to induce the agent to learn a policy w † while minimizing his own cost of attacking, i.e., the attack's problem we give in Section 2. 
Remark 7. If the norm in the attacker's problem (11) is a Frobenius norm, the attacker's problem is a convex minimization problem which can be easily solved by omniscient attackers using software packages like MOSEK [16] , CVX [13] etc. If AttackCost(c) is the number of state-action pair where the cost has been falsified, i.e.,, AttakCost(c) = ∑ i ∑ a 1 1 {c(i,a) =c(i,a)} , then the attacker's problem becomes a combinatorial optimization problem [21] .
Remark 8. If the actions available to the adversary only allow the adversary to falsify the true cost at certain states S ′ ⊂ S (or/and at certain actions A ′ ⊂ A ), then the adversary's problem (11) becomes
However, if the adversary can only falsify at certain states S ′ , the attacker may not be able to make the RL agent learn the adversary desired policy w † .
Without loss of generality, suppose that the adversary can only falsify the cost at states S ′ = {1, 2, ..., S ′ }. We rewrite the conditions given in (10) into a more compact form:c
where the equality only holds for one component of the vector, i.e., the i-th component satisfying w(i) = a. Partition the vectorc a andc w † in (12) into two parts, the part where the adversary can falsify the cost denoted byc f al a ,c f al w † ∈ R S ′ and the part where the adversary cannot falsify c true a , c true
where
. Note that the ith component ofc f al w † (i) is equal to the i component ofc f al w † If the adversary wants the RL agent to learn w † , the adversary needs to designc f al a , a ∈ A such that the conditions in (13) hold. Whether the conditions in (12) are easy to achieve or not really depends on what the true costs c true a , a ∈ A are. The following results tell that under some conditions on the transition probability, no matter what the true costs are, the adversary can find properc f al a , a ∈ A such that conditions (13) are satisfied. For i ∈ S \S ′ , if w(i) = a, we delete the row of M a corresponds to the state i ∈ S \S ′ . Denote the new matrix after deletion byM a .
Remark 9.
To check if the condition on H is true or not, one has to resort to Gordan's theorem [7] : Either Hx < 0 has a solution x, or H T y = 0 has a nonzero solution y with y ≥ 0. The adversary can use linear/convex programming software to check if this is the case. For example, by solving
the adversary will know whether the condition about H given in Theorem 5 is true or not. If the minimum of (14) is 0, the adversary cannot guarantee the agent will learn the policy w † . If the minimum of (14) is positive, there exists x such that Hx < 0. The adversary can selectc f al w † = λ x and choose a sufficiently large λ to make sure conditions (13) hold which means the adversary can learn the policy w † no matter what the true costs are. An example will be given in next section to illustrate more on the selection of falsified cost signals.
Numerical Example
In this section, we use the application of water reservoir operation to illustrate the security issues of RL. Consider a RL agent aiming to create the best operation policies for the hydroelectric reservoir system described in Fig. 2 . The system consists of the following: (1) an inflow conduit regulated by Val 0 , which can either be a river or a spillway from another dam; and (2) two spillways for outflow: the first penstock, Val 1 , which is connected to the turbine and thus generates electricity, and the second penstock, Val 2 , allowing direct water evacuation without electricity generation. We consider three reservoir levels: MinOperL, MedOperL, MaxExtL. Weather conditions and the operation of valves are key factors that affect the reservoir level. In practice, there are usually interconnected hydroelectric reservoir systems located at different places which makes it difficult to find an optimal operational policy. For illustrative purposes, we only consider controlling of Val 1 . Thus, we have two actions: either a 1 ,Val 1 = 'shut down'; or a 2 , Val 1 = 'open'. Hence A = {a 1 , a 2 }. We consider three states which represent three different reservoir levels, denoted by S = {1, 2, 3} where 1(2, 3) represents MaxExtL (MedOperL, MinOperL, respectively). The goal of the operators is to generate more electricity to increase economic benefits, which requires the reservoir to store sufficient amount of water to generate electricity. Meanwhile, the operator also aims to avoid possible overflows which can be caused by the unexpected heavy rain in the reservoir area or in upper areas. The operator needs to learn a safe policy, i.e., the valve needs to be open at state 1 so that the cost at c(1, a 1 ) needs to be high. We assume that the uncertain and intermittent nature is captured by the transition probability given by And the true cost is assumed to be c = [30 − 5; 6 − 10; 0 0]. Negative cost can be interpreted as the reward for hydroelectric production. Let the discounted factor β be 0.8. The limit Q-values learned from Q-learning algorithm (2) 
Basically, the optimal policy indicates that one should keep the valve open to avoid overflowing and generate more electricity at MaxExtL. While at MinOperL, one should keep the valve closed in order to store more water for water supply and power generation purposes. From (5) , we know that the resulted change in Q * under malicious falsification is bounded by the change in the cost with a Lipschitz constant 1/(1 − β ). To see this, we randomly generate 100 falsifications h ∈ R 3×2 using randi(10) * rand (3, 2) in Matlab. For each falsified costc = c + h, we obtain the corresponding Q-factorsQ * . We plot Q * − Q * corresponding with c − c for each falsification in Fig. 3 . One can clearly see the bound given in (5) . The result in Fig. 3 corroborates Theorem 2. Suppose that the adversary aims to mislead the agent to learn a policy w † where w † (1) = a 1 , w † (2) = a 2 , w † (3) = a 1 . The purpose is to keep the valve shut down at MaxExtL which will cause overflow and hence devastating consequences. The adversary can utilize D Q * (w † ) to see how much at least he has to falsify the original costc to achieve the desired policy w † . The value of D Q * (w † ) can be obtained by solving the following optimization problem:
The value of D Q * (w † ) is thus 17.66. By (5) , we know that to achieve w † , the adversary has to falsify the cost such that c − c ≥ (1 − β )D Q * (w † ) = 3.532. If the actions available to the adversary to achieve bounded falsification to one state-action pair with bound 3.5 which is strictly less than 3.523, then it is impossible for the adversary to at-tain its goal, i.e., misleading the agent to the policy w † targeted by the adversary. Thus, in this MDP-FC, the robust region of c to the adversary's desired policy w † is 3.532. In Fig. 4 , we plot the change of the limit Q-values when only the cost at one stateaction pair is falsified while other components are fixed at c = [9 − 5; 6 − 10; 0 0]. We can see that when other costs are fixed, for every j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, b ∈ {a 1 , a 2 } the functioñ c(i, a) → [Q * ] j,b is piece-wise linear. And the change of the slope happens only when the policy changes. This illustrates our arguments about the differentiability of the mapping c →Q * in Theorem 3. From the first two plots, one can see that changes in costs at one state can deviate the policy at another state. That is when altering the cost at MedOperL, the adversary can make the valve open at MinOperL so that the reservoir cannot store enough water to maintain the water supply and generate electricity. When the adversary aims to manipulate the policy at one state, he does not have to alter the cost at this state. The optimal policy is thus w * (1) = a 2 , w * (2) = a 2 , w * (3) = a 1 . By (8) in Theorem 3, the derivative of f :
One can see that G is a constant independent of c. Suppose that the adversary fal- If the adversary aims to have the hydroelectric reservoir system operates follow policy w † , the falsified costc has to satisfy conditions given in (10) . Let the targeted policy of the adversary be w † (1) = a 1 , w † (2) = a 2 , w † (3) = a 2 . If the adversary can deceptively falsify the cost at every state-action pair to any value, it is not difficult to findc satisfying (10) . For example, the adversary can first selectc w † = [c(1, a 1 )c(2, a 2 )c(3, a 2 )] T , e.g.,c w † = [3 2 1] T . Then select cost at other state-action pairs followingc(i, a) = (1 i − β P ia ) T (I − β P w † ) −1c w † + ξ for i ∈ S , a ∈ A \{w † (i)}where ξ > 0. Then,c satisfies conditions (10) . Let ξ = 1, the adversary will havec = [3 10.86; −1.34 2; 0.34 1]. The Q-factors learned fromc isQ * = [15 18.46; 8.15 7.14; 5.99 5; ]. Thus, the resulted policy is the adversary desired policy w † . Hence, we say if the adversary can deceptively falsify the cost at every state-action pair to any value, the adversary can make the RL agent learn any policy.
If the adversary can only deceptively falsify the cost at states S ′ , we have to resort to Theorem 5 to see what he can achieve. Suppose S ′ = {1, 2} and the adversary desired policy w † (1) = a 1 , w † (2) = a 2 , w † (3) = a 2 . Given S ′ and w † , (13) 
Since the last row in the second equality is automatically satisfied, we have H = [−0.5906 − 0.4762] whose range space is R which intersects (−∞, 0). Thus, no matter what c(3, a 1 ) and c(3, a 2 ) are the adversary can always findc(1, a 1 ),c(2, a 2 ) such that c(3, a 1 ) > M a 1 c(1, a 1 ) c(2, a 2 ) + 2.0667 × c(3, a 2 ).
Next, choosec(2, a 1 ) andc(1, a 2 ) bỹ We hence can see that no matter what the true cost is, the adversary can make the RL agent learn w † by falsifying only the cost at sates S ′ = {1, 2}. It can also be easily seen that when the adversary can only falsify the cost at state S = {1}, he can still make the RL agent learn the policy w † no matter what the true cost is.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, a general framework has been introduced to study RL under deceptive falsification of cost signals where different kinds of attack models have been presented. We have provided a theoretical underpinnings to analyze the attack models for understanding the fundamental limits and performance bounds on the attack and the defense in RL systems. The robust region of the cost can be utilized by both offensive side and defensive sides. For the RL agent, it can be used to evaluate the robustness to malicious falsifications. For the adversary, the robust region can be used to estimate whether certain objectives can be achieved or not. Conditions given in Theorem 4 provides a fundamental understanding of the strategic adversarial behavior of the adversary. Future work would focus on investigating a particular attack model we have presented in Section 2.2 and extending them based on the analytical tools we have introduced in this work.
